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Reply to Kiers et al.: Economic and
biological clarity in the theory
of mutualism
Kiers et al. (1) make three main points. First, they noted that
many mutualisms involve multiple symbionts interacting with
a single host. We agree, and we explained that partner ﬁdelity
feedback (PFF) can function because plants generally “limit,
withdraw, or even abscise investment in shoots, ﬂowers, and
roots (or subsets of any of these) after physical damage or
deﬁcits of...resources...” (2). This “modularity” of plant hosts
(3)separates theeffectsofdifferent symbionts andallows thehost
to react to individual symbionts. Modularity is easily incorporated
into our model, because (with no change in our results) principal-
agent theory allows the assumption of one agent per host to be
replaced with a less restrictive one: let the host react differently to
different agents. This assumption is well accepted in plant physi-
ology and by existing mutualism theory (2).
The problem to which we alluded is when hosts cannot react
differently, such as when mixtures of symbionts occur within
modules. Kiers et al. (1) mention the example of multiple moths
on yucca ﬂowers. To the extent that cheater moths individually
cause enough damage, cheaters are reliably exposed to host
response, but noncheaters escape ﬂoral abortion when they do
not oviposit alongside cheaters (4).
Second, Kiers et al. (1) state that host response is only “an ef-
ﬁcient way of distributing resources to partners differing in net
mutualistic beneﬁt, with effects on symbiont ﬁtness as...side ef-
fects.” Again, we agree. We made the same argument, and dic-
tionary deﬁnitions and precedent (2) have led us to call this
feedback PFF, whereas Kiers et al. call it host sanction (HS). PFF
is the theory that hosts maximize their prospective ﬁtness, e.g.,
by “balancing the cost of maintaining a damaged...part against
the cost of abscission and...cost of the lost contribution...to
future growth...without...consideration of the effect of abscis-
sionon[symbiont]ﬁtness...”(2).Incontrast,underourdeﬁnition
of HS, hosts infer symbiont behavior to punish cheaters, which
invokes the game-theoretical concept of commitment.
Regardless of what we call PFF and HS, our contribution
was to show how to test for them in real systems. Both require
that punishment be sufﬁciently harmful to the symbiont, so
demonstrating that cheaters suffer a ﬁtness-reducing host
response is not enough.
Third, Kiers et al. (1) say that our description of the biology
of the legume-rhizobia system is incorrect. We strongly dis-
agree. For instance, it is essential to our argument that plants
“shut down nodules if they can obtain cheaper N from external
sources.” PFF predicts that hosts shut down nodules both
when rhizobia cheat and when they get sufﬁcient N from the
soil (even though the rhizobia initially continue ﬁxing nitrogen).
Similarly, we did not confuse N2 and NH3. The elegant ex-
periment of Kiers et al. (5) made rhizobia “cheat” by exposing
r o o t st oa na t m o s p h e r el a c k i n gN 2, thereby preventing rhizobia
from ﬁxing N2. The implicit assumption is that the plants
cannot measure N2 concentration, because if they could, this
experiment could be interpreted as indicating how plants re-
spond to a N2-poor atmosphere.
We are grateful to Kiers et al. for the opportunity to clarify
our arguments.
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